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If the costs of higher education in the developing countries wer«
shared using fees paid by higher income parents with the ability to
pay, additional resources would be available for education. This re-
quires computing a parents' expected contribution, the methods for
which are developed here for developing countries for the first time
Increased resource recovery with some reallocation to primary levels
where rates of return are higher would increase efficiency. Fees
would also permit attainment of some economies of scale, and discour-
age college students from wasting time. Equity would increase since
the higher income groups who benefit from higher education would be
less heavily subsidized, and the poor who pay the most taxes would
less frequently be excluded.
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The total economic cost of higher education includes the potential
earnings of the student foregone by the family, which are represented
approximately by the room and board costs often borne by the student
and his parents. Viewed in this way, the contributions made by
parents and students are the major source of financing total higher
education costs, of which tuition is a part, in the United States,
Japan, and some of the other industrialized countries. It is these
total costs that determine whether the student can attend or not, and
they are analyzed in many studies, including Johnstone's (1986) recent
book, and some of the papers in this volume.
The developing countries can afford to waste resources even less
and are often inefficiently subsidizing the tuition and living costs
of students from high income families who do not need the aid. Fail-
ure to be more selective in the award of aid is also inequitable in
that the taxes are borne mainly by poor families who are largely ex-
cluded from these institutions. To select among the many academically
qualified students in order to limit the large current aid as fees are
raised to those that have true need, and thereby to increase the re-
sources available for education without merely driving out the able
students from poor families, requires developing a financial need
analysis to determine the parents' expected contribution. Yet this
appears to be the first article that has ever been published that
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considers how the parents' expected contribution can be determined in
the developing countries. This is remarkable in that there are in-
creasing needs for more adequate and acceptable resource recovery as
development occurs.
The need for more adequate financing of education in the develop-
ing countries, since it is a socially productive and relatively advan-
tageous form of investment, has been developed by Psacharopoulos
,
Tan, and Jimenez ( Financing Education in Developing Countries , 1986),
McMahon, Millot, and Eng (1986, pp. 90-6), Psacharopoulos and Mingat
(1985), Mingat and Tan (1986), and Jimenez (1986, 1987). The two key
policy options they all recommend are 1) recovering more of the public
cost of higher education to make it more self-sustaining, and reallo-
cating some of the tax revenue thereby released to primary, junior
secondary, and other areas of education with the highest social rates
of return, and 2) developing a credit market for education together
with selective scholarships, especially in higher education.
The student loan portion of this financing package as it applies
in developing nations has been studied extensively previously by
Woodhall (1983), and is developed further by her in this special issue
of EER . But as fees rise, to prevent the exclusion of qualified stu-
dents from poor families, subsidized student loans and other financial
aids require greater selectivity among those who are academically
qualified and able based on economic need. This is recognized as "an
indispensible feature of all scholarship schemes" (Psacharopoulos,
Tan, and Jimenez, 1986, p. 32). But except for some work on what
would be required for a uniform system of means testing in Indonesia
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by McMahon, Millot, and Eng (1986, pp. 94-6), there simply does not
seem to be any literature on the subject of adapting the concepts and
methods to the special conditions typical of developing countries.
After considering the financial problem and this available solu-
tion, this paper then will consider how use of an objective means test
to make subsidies more selective has the potential of increasing both
the efficiency with which education can contribute more to growth ? and ic
equity. With respect to the potential for greater efficiency, over-
burdened tax systems limit the expansion of all of education and pre-
vent the attainment of economies of scale in higher education, keeping
unit costs higher than they need to be (e.g., Psacharopoulos 1980).
Simultaneously the well to do parents of most of the college students
at public institutions contribute remarkably little to tuition and
even to living costs in many developing nations, especially in the
poorest nations of Africa (e.g., Psacharopoulos, Tan, and Jimenez,
1986, p. 55). With rapidly increasing numbers of "qualified" students
finishing high school, the capacity to meet the effective demand at
the public universities is severely strained, and private sector
institutions sometimes are hastily organized to fill the gap (e.g.,
McMahon, Millot, and Eng, 1986, pp. 136-96, 219-22, 164-67). Apart
from the limits that high room and board subsidies and free tuition
for higher education place on attainment of economies of scale and on
the capacity to meet growing social demand, they also contribute to
inefficiency in the use of time by college students. In Indonesia,
for example, it takes 6.5 years to complete a 4 year university de-
gree, which raises the cycle costs and limits quality ( ibid . , p. 307).
The external efficiency is also reduced as unnecessary financing
limitations reduce the capacity of higher education to contribute
significantly to the diffusion and adaptation of technical change and
thereby to growth, albeit with a lag of 5 years or more in Africa at
least (McHahon, 1987). But even this contribution is more limited
when available resources from parents are not utilized, and scarce
tax resources are partially wasted. Since the social returns to
primary education are so high, and since human resources are normally
the largest and most underdeveloped single type of economic resource
in most developing countries, this inefficiency and failure to tap
available resources is a real impediment to development.
To introduce briefly the problems with inequity, the benefits from
subsidized higher education in the developing nations are enjoyed
primarily by the highest income groups. It is estimated that 51 to
83% of the benefits of higher education in various countries go to the
top 20 to 38%, respectively, according to Psacharopoulos , Tan, and
Jimenez (1986, pp. 14, 56, and 61). Yet these benefits are financed
with taxes, 60-85% of which are collected from families whose income
is below this level (see Table 2 below). Furthermore their children,
often from rural areas, are largely excluded from higher education
(Psacharopoulos, Tan, and Jimenez (1986, p. 15).
Beyond this, the income distribution in lower income economies
tends to be more unequal than it is in the United States and other
industrialized nations (World Bank, 1986, pp. 226-7). Over 50% of the
income, and over 50% of the capacity to finance higher education
therefore, arises within this highest 20% income bracket whereas those
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in lower income groups than this pay 75% of the costs. The evidence
in the United States in McMahon (19S4, 1974) and in Western Europe
developed by Johnstone (1936) is that most parents tend to be both
willing and able to contribute to the support of their children in
college if asked.
In this paper Part 1 will consider the specific problems of inef-
ficiency and inequity that would be addressed if a uniform methodology
for the appraisal of financial need to determine the parents' expected
contribution were implemented within each developing country. Part II
develops the concepts and Part III presents sample forms and discusses
the potential problems involved in assessing financial need in the
LDC's. Part IV considers how financial need analysis and a more spe-
cific expected parents' contribution contributes to efficiency and to
equity, and Part V tests the effects of some reallocation of education
financing on productivity growth in Africa. The final section
summarizes the conclusions.
I. Basic Problems
Inequity
The highest income groups benefit most from the tuition and living
expense subsidies to higher education as can be seen in Table 1. The
Table 1
The Share of Higher Income Subsidies
Received by Different Income Groups
Poorest Poorest
30% 40%
Columbia 6%
Malaysia 10
Indonesia 7
Chile 15%
Source: Psacharopoulos , Tan, and Jimenez (1986, p. 61).
Highest
30%
Highest
20%
60%
51
83%
= 55
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20% to 30% receiving the highest income also receive 51% to 83% of the
benefits of public higher education subsidies. This is true in spite
of long queues of academically qualified students who seek admission.
At the same time, the poorest 30-40% of the population receive only
6-10% of the benefits, as illustrated for the countries shown in
Table 1. Yet this lowest income group pays up to 40% of the direct
and indirect taxes used to support higher education as illustrated for
these and other countries shown in Table 2.
Table 2
The Inci dence of Taxation by Income Gr oup.
Lowest Income Highest Income
18.5% 26.7%
17.1 29.9
17.7 42.1
40.2 14.9
15.0 25.3
23.0 33.5
Chile
Colombia
Malaysia
Mexico
Pakistan
Philippines
Source: Jimenez (1986, p. 116).
This income redistribution from the poor to the rich is all the
more (vertically) inequitable in view of the fact that the income
distribution in the developing countries is more unequal at the outset
than it is in the United States or other Western market economies.
This is shown in Table 3.
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Table 3
Percent of Income Received by Lowest and Highest
Quintiles of Households
Developing Nations
Industrial Economics
Exhibit: United States
Lowest Next to Highest
20% Highest 20%
4.8% 20.7% 52.0%
6.9 23.4 40.2
5.5 25.0 39.9
Source: World Bank (1986, pp. 226-7).
In industrial economies including the United States, only 40% of so of
the incone is received by the highest income group. A. larger share
than in the developing countries goes to the next highest 20% of the
households. In contrast, 52% of the income in developing countries
goes to the highest income group.
The problem is that this highest income group has most of the
ability to pay for higher education and also receives most of the
highly subsidized benefits. Yet they pay very little of the costs.
Taxes on the poor limit expansion of education. It is this higher
income group that needs to be asked to contribute to its costs if
higher education in the developing countries is to be financed more
adequately.
Inefficiency
Hisallocation Due to Underinvestment in Primary . The returns in
developing countries to investment in primary education tend to be
about twice as high as the returns to investment in higher education,
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This is shown by the social rates of return to each of these forms of
investment which are the best available measure of the growth payoff
in Table 4 below. If higher education could become more self-
financing, especially in Africa, Latin America, and South East Asia,
tax funds could be used to expand access to primary and secondary
education more rapidly, and to improve its quality. This should
contribute to economic growth, especially in the very poor African
countries where per capita income is currently falling. The per
capita growth rates in Zaire are -1.3%, Zambia -1.3%, Ghana -2.1%,
and Madagascar -1.2% according to the World Bank (1986, p. 67). There
is the further positive effect of primary and secondary education of
women in lowering fertility rates (e.g., Schultz, 1974, pp. 3-30),
thereby indirectly contributing to the pe r capita growth that is so
desparately needed in these places.
Table 4
Returns to Education in Developing Countries
Social Rate of Return Private Rate of Return
Primary Secondary Higher Primary Secondary Higher
Africa 26 17 13 45 26 32
Asia 27 15 13 31 15 18
Latin America 26 13 16 17 13 13
High Unit Costs . Relatively low percentages of higher education
costs are covered by fees in developing countries, which hold costs
high, and prevent more efficient attainment of economies of scale.
The extraordinarily small portion of costs borne by parents can be
seen in Table 5. In many of the poorest countries public higher
Africa
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Table 5
Cos t Recover y in Higher Educ at Lon, 1080
User Fees as Percent of Public Unit Costs
Latin America
Botsv/ana 02 r Bolivia 1%
Somalia Brazil 5
Kenya Chile 25
Lesotho 5 Colombia 3.4
Malawi 1 Costa Rica 8
Mauritius Domini caii Tieipublic 1
Sudan Ecuador 2
Tanzania Guatemala 10
Uganda Honduras 10
Guinea Paraguay 0.7
Nigeria 12. 4 Uruguay 5
Burundi 14. 8
Burkina Faso Asia
Mauritania
Malaysia 5.8
Asia Pakistan
Philippines
2.1
3.7
India 29. 1% Thailand 6.9
Indonesia- 13. Solomon Islamds 0.9
Korea 23. 4 Turkey 15.0
Source: Psacharopoulos , Tan, and Jimenez (1986, p. 55).
' Indonesia doubled the tuition charged at public institutions
during 1986. This would raise the percent shown here, but by
less than 13% given that all prices have risen during this
period.
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education for the relatively well to do is totally free. In the
country that has expanded higher education the farthest of any in the
list, South Korea, and where economic growth also Is the highest in
the world, a much higher 23.4% of public higher education insti-
utional costs (not including foregone earnings) are borne by the
family. This percentage approaches the pattern found in the United
States
.
Where fees are low, the public cost per student are high. These
costs which must be borne by taxpayers limit expansion, and thereby
prevent still further cost reductions by limiting the attainment of
economies of scale. This problem is illustrated in Figure 1. For
purposes of international comparisons, the average cost per student
(AC) on the vertical axis is "deflated" by dividing by income per
capita, thereby expressing it in relation to local standards of
living. The scale of the higher education establishment oa the hori-
zontal axis is expressed as a percentage of the relevant age cohort
that is enrolled in higher educational institutions. If as effective
demand increases, the scarcity of tax revenue in non-profit production
forces public expenditure per student to approximate costs, then the
result is not a demand curve but instead a long run cost curve as
demand shifts outward, although the data points do of course represent
a joint solution. In fact, on this basis a very pronounced L-shaped
curve like a long run average cost curve for higher educational
expansion in Figure 1 emerges. It is clear that if more students
could be enrolled by using fees to lower the public cost per student,
then greater efficiencies at large scale in the institutional costs
per student (and in the use of public funds) could be achieved.
-11-
Figure 1
Long Run Average Costs for Higher Education
(Cost per student on the vertical axis, "deflated" by
national per capita income to permit international comparisons)
Income
Per
Capita
AC/Y
10.0
I
5.6
Cost
Per
Student 2.2
*
2.0
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.0
.8
.6
.4
.2
. Malawi
. Tanzania
Uganda
Camerons
* Developing Countries
Average
\ \
\ \
A
US
\( Demand^
^ *V ^ndus t rial
\ . UK Countries^
Mexico \ V Average
Singapore .. Hong Kong \ . Sweden
. S. Korea * \ Japan
>f ^_ Scale
"> 57T6>10 15 20 25
Number enrolled, as a percent of the
population aged 20-24
Source: Calculated from Psacharopoulos (1980, pp. 23 and 73) and Y
from World Bank (1981, pp. 134-5). Indonesia AC are from
McMahon, Millot and Eng (1986, p. 300), with ER and Y from
World Bank (1985, p. 222; 1983, p. 148). Data for many
countries other than those shown for illustrative purposes
are given by Psacharopoulos (1980, p. 73).
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II. Potential Solutions: Uniform Determination of
a Parents' Expected Contribution
To address both the problems of inefficiency and inequity, £/»«re
are basically four problems that must be addressed in determining
financial need, and thereby determining the parents' expected contri-
bution based on this needs assessment. Some are conceptual, others
statistical-political, and still others relate to the practical
administration of an efficient system.
The Concept of a Uniform Methodology
The first problem that must be faced in determining the parents'
expected contribution is the conceptual one of developing a national
standard of "ability to pay" that applies a uniform methodology free
of favoritism. This involves measuring parents' income and wealth,
allowing deductions for their own support now and after retirement,
and for other dependents, to determine "available income." The prob-
lems unique to developing countries are a greater role for the ex-
tended family, a smaller market economy, fewer written records, and
more favoritism fostered by a rule of persons rather than of law
accompanied by objective reporting. These problems must be addressed.
But with some experimentation, they would not appear to be insur-
mountable. Some function of the estimate of available income obtained
by methods discussed below then can be viewed as "taxed" as a rate is
applied to determine the parents' expected contribution. The beauty
is that this tax does not have to be collected by the government, but
instead is contributed voluntarily later by the parents to the son or
daughter to help cover his or her tuition and living costs.
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Roora and board costs are covered by costly public maintenance
grants in many of the developing countries, a practice that even
extends to secondary boarding schools in several African countries.
These living costs are an essential part of the analysis, and are a
major portion of the costs of the higher education to the society.
They represent, approximately the foregone earnings costs of the
investment which are usually borne by the parents, at least in the
U.S. as they refrain from consumption and send the resources saved to
the children in college as part of the family's total investment in
education. The high dropout rates after primary school in most
developing countries as well as low enrollments in higher education
are due in large part to the burden of these costs. Low income
parents cannot continue to forego indefinitely the help of the child
in agriculture, or alternatively to forego getting the child employed
and thereby independent of the family budget constraint.
Determining the amount of family income available to cover not
only tuition, therefore, but also foregone earnings (room and board
costs) is in principle the same problem as that faced by each nation's
income tax system (if any) in establishing exemption levels and
deductions for other dependents. It is only after this that a "tax"
rate can be applied to determine the parents expected contribution.
It is suggested, therefore, that if the developing country in question
has an income tax, the literature about it and the experience in
establishing deductions and exemptions it has established is a good
place to look for local experience when developing criteria for a
uniform methodology measuring the ability to pay.
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The Data
The second problem is one of collecting verifiable and accurate
data. The specifics will be considered below. But again, this is the
same problem faced by any income tax.
The basic conflict is between simplicity and equity, or sensitivity
to individual differences. In developing countries, especially at
first, it is probably better to err in the direction of simplicity and
verif iability
.
In non-market economies it is important that much of the data be
self -verifying in the sense that it is about objects or behavior that
is obvious to others who know the family, and therefore very hard to
distort. For example, the number of acres farmed (usually recorded
in provincial offices^, trips abroad, and the year and model of any
cars or color TV owned might serve as a basis for estimating income
and real estate assets. Other data such as specific lines from tax
forms in those countries that do have an income tax are not self-
verifying, but can be checked if the family financial statement
deviates from the earnings of others in the same occupation as re-
vealed by national labor force or census surveys, and therefore can
be verified if necessary. This kind of tax form information is
usually available for civil servants, and higher income business
people, but often not for others in developing countries. Amounts
reported can be cross checked for reasonableness by computer once the
norms are stored in the memory from census and national labor force
survey data.
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Although the data problems must be addressed, they are unlikely
to be the real obstacle. Experience suggests that those who are
opposed to charging those who benefit from the current subsidies will
frequently confuse the issue by exaggerating the difficulties involved
in collecting accurate and verifiable data. There is also a lack of
knowledge of how to do it that leads to reluctance. In developing
countries where there frequently are not objective records (such as
1099 IRS form reports by employers to the IRS), and where there is a
network of favoritism on which the government in power depends, there
is likely to be quiet opposition to changing the status quo. This is
a political problem, not a data problem. From a strict data collec-
tion perspective, efficient collection of simple and verifiable data
after some experimentation is not likely to be an insurmountable
problem.
Design of an Efficient System
The administrative problem of designing a relatively low cost
nationwide collection and data processing system is the simplest to
resolve, given the years of experience with this by the American
College Testing Program and the College Entrance Examination Board in
the U.S.
All developing nations have mail services, some of them cheaper
and faster than the U.S. A. centralized computerized processing of a
simple mark-sensed form, filled out by the parent, and mailed to the
central processing center enables objective criteria to be applied
equally to all. Once the agreed upon criteria are programmed into the
computer and published, this uniform methodology avoids personal
favoritism. The standardized criteria can be openly discussed, and
printouts of the parents expected contribution mailed to the parents
and to the university officers administering the student loan, tuition
waiver, and work-study programs. Each financial aid officer then has
the same measure of "unmet need" for the student before him, including
guideline limits for the tuition waiver, work-study, and student loan
amounts making up the financial aid package. The "parents' expected
contribution" is self enforcing within the family, and the "unmet
need" total (if any) sets the upper limit for the total financial aid
package including access to student loans at subsidized rates. Once
programmed into the computer, the uniform methodology with its
published criteria openly discussed should significantly reduce the
capriciousness
,
personal favoritism, and even sometimes dishonesty
that is sometimes an impediment to incentives in developing countries.
A.s fees are raised to eliminate maintenance grants and cover
larger fractions of higher education institution costs, the need be-
comes increasingly acute to be more selective in the dispersal of
grants, loans, and work-study. If qualified students from poor
families are merely excluded as less qualified students from wealthy
families are admitted, this merely sacrifices social efficiency by
losing relatively more able students than those who can stay and
equity by excluding the poor again by this other means. Once students
have been determined to have clear merit, and be qualified, by virtue
of their being admissible, then an objective method of determining
economic need as a basis for deciding upon the size of the financial
aid package to be awarded is, therefore, an indispensible feature for
a socially efficient and equitable system.
III. A Suggested Solution to the Practical Problems
of Calculating the Parents' Expected Contribution
A Family Information Form for collecting the necessary financial
information for determining the parents' expected contribution to set
limits for the more selective distribution of financial aid is shown
on the next page. It is a prototype reflecting conditions found in
most developing countries. Income taxes tend to be paid by only a few
civil servants and wealthy persons, the extended family has a more
important role, there is a larger non-market largely rural sector, and
past traditions have used more of a personal assessment, personal
favoritism system. This form is designed to address all four of these
situations. The form is illustrated for Indonesia. But with minor
deletions and adaptation of language, it should be ready for experi-
mentation or pilot testing followed by refinements and use in almost
any developing country.
Just as with any Family Financial Statement (FFS) in the United
States or West Germany, the form must be filled in by the parent who
has access to the records and knows his or her income, and counter-
signed by the students seeking aid. The form emphasizes that it is an
application for financial aid, although of course without this aid,
the point is that the parents and/or extended family must cover the
students' tuition and living expenses. It is for this reason that it
is important that the student by involved in signing the form. There
is no tax collector involved, and the parents' contribution later will
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be a natter between the parent and the student. It is not a nark-
sensed forn because most parents in developing countries are unlikely
to be faniliar with these. Also the cost of clerical labor to
transforn the data for use by a conputer
Denographic Infornation as a Basis for
Parental Living Allowance Deductions
No questions are asked on this form (or or should be asked), that
are not either self-verifying in the sense that their answers are
readily observable to the student or others who know the fanily, or
else that could not be verified should the need arise. This simple
principle encourages honesty.
The identifying infornation in questions 1-5 provide the fanily
and college financial aid officer addresses to which the results con-
taining the parents' expected contribution and suggested financial aid
package (if any) can be nailed. The denographic infornation in ques-
tions 6-8 provide the basis for conputer calculations described later
of the parents' living and retirenent allowances.
Incone and Assets for Those Who File
Tax Forns (Questions 9-13)
The tax nunber is very significant in Indonesia (Q. 9) and some
other places. If a person has one, it means they are a civil servant
above rank 3A, possessing at least a Sarjana degree, or are enployed
by a private firns with incomes in the top 10% or so of the popula-
tion. Incone infornation is requested fron a specific line of the
Isiian Waj ib Pajak (tax form) that must be filed (Q. 10), which
increases the accuracy with which it is reported and permits
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AP PLICATION FOR FINANCIAL AID
FAMILY INFORMATION FORM
To be filled in by the parent of a_ student seeking financial aid .
Mail to Department of Education and Culture before May 1.*
Warning : All information is subject to verification. If you pur-
posely give false or misleading information to establish eligibility
for student aid, you can be fined Tip 16,000, receive a prison
sentence, or both.*
1. What university does your son or daughter plan to attend, or
attend now?
College Name and City
2. Student son or daughter's name:
Last First Middle
3. Parent's name filling out this form:
Last First Middle
4. Parent's home mailing address:
„____________
Number Street City Province
5. Student's next year in college: Freshman 2nd 3rd
4th \ 5th
6. Parents' marital status: Married Divorced Father Deceased
7. Age of the older parent is years.
8. Number of family members that you support:
a. Number of your children that will be receiving over one-half of
their support from you next year (include the student):
b. Number of other family members to be living at home and receiving
one-half of their support from you. Include elderly parents,
grandchildren, and other family members herei
c. Number of children of those included in question 8a to be away at
a boarding school or college next year:
9. Do you have a tax number? Yes No. If so, what Ls it?
(If you do not have a tax number, skip the next
section, and go to the family financial information Tax Number
section beginning with question 14.)
PARENTS' FINANCIAL STATEMENT
Please refer to your most recent Isiian Wajib Pajak* (Tax Form) to
complete the next few questions:
10. What is the total income of your family for the year just ended
reported on line of your Isiian Wajib Pajak? Rp
(This includes the wife's income, and that of other family members
living with you who work.)
11. What are your total assets reported on line of your Isiian
Wajib Pajak (Tax Form)? Rp
12. How much tax did you pay, based on this tax form? Rp
*For illustrative purposes only. This is the practice in the United States,
not in Indonesia.
-20-
13. What are the specific assets reported on line
of your tax form?
Value Now Amount Owed
Parents' home *P » *e
Mortgage Rp
Financial assets and investments Rp Other bank
Other real estate, business, debt P
or farm RP
14. What kind of a house do you have?
Rumah Tembok (brick house)
~ Runah Setengah Tembok (half brick)
Rumah Bilik (bamboo)
15. How ^n7 hectares do you own, if any? (Insert here number recorded
at the Province level for the Kabupatan.) nectares
16. What is your occupation?
17. Do you have: Water buffalo? How many? _____
Electricity at home? A car?
A color TV? A telephone at home?
18. How many years of education have you completed?
College?
_____
STUDENT INFORMATION
19. With whom will you live next year while in college?
(a) At home with parents (if parents live near enough to
the
college)
(b) College dormitory or rented room
(c) A brother, uncle, or other relative _ —
(If you answered 19(a) or 19(b), skip the next section and go to
question
INFORMATION ABOUT RELATIVE WITH WHOM YOU WILL LIVE
20. What is the name and address of this brother or other
relative
with whom you will live? ____ „ _ ——
.
——
—
Name Address
21. Does this member of your eKtended family have a tax number?
Yes No If so, what is it? . —__
22. Approximately how much tax did he pay?
None . Rp. Don't Know
23. What is his occupation? , —r—---—
—
What is his rank (if in the military, or civil service). _____
CERTIFICATION AND SIGNATURES
I certify that the information on this form is complete and correct.
^
If necessary for verification, I permit an authorized official to
ma<te
inquiries, and agree to send a xerox copy of ray last Isiian Wajib
Pajak Tax Form if asked. I do realize that if I don't respond to _ the
request for proof when asked, the student will not receive
financial aia.
At least one parent must sign: ,—
_
_—„ —
—
Parent's Signature uate
Student must also sign: . , — — —KT~~~
Student's Signature uate
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verification later. It includes the income from "second jobs," the
wife's income, and the income of other family members. Assets are
reported on another page (Q. 11-2), and also could be verified Lf the
form is selected for auditing. This information therefore piggy-backs
on the enforcement by the Ministry of Finance of the nation's tax
laws. If the parents actually were assessed any tax based on this
form by the tax authorities (Q. 13), they are probably in the top 1%
or so of the income and wealth holders in the country.
Estimating Income and Wealth for Those
Who Do Not File Tax Forms
Questions 14-13 that follow get away from using the favoritism-
ridden subjective practice used in many developing countries of asking
the neighborhood leader to report the parents' income or wealth. In
Indonesia the neighborhood leader who is elected will report anything
to please. These reports are then certified by the village head and
seldom changed since he does not know the income of all of the people
in the village. The Provincial official who receives it basically
only wields a rubber stamp. The procedure suggested here gets away
from this "rule by men," moving toward a "rule by law" and the more
objective assessment it implies.
Questions 14-18 are for those who do not file tax forms, many of
tfhom are in rural villages where non-market aspects of the economy
loom more important. The value of real estate is assessed at the
provincial level in Indonesia, which is common elsewhere as well, and
is a verifiable basis for estimating wealth. Occupation and education
can be used for estimating income. The national labor force surveys
(SUSENAS and SAKARNAS in Indonesia) collect detailed information on
income from a sample of 367,000 persons in all provinces that can be
used for imputing income and for checking returns for reasonableness.
Other developing nations do usually have these labor force, social and
economic, and/or census surveys that cover earnings or at least con-
sumption, although many are not as well developed as those in
Indonesia. Questions 14, 17, and 13 about the kind of home, electri-
fication, cars, and TV are mostly intended as cross checks.
The Extended Fami ly
The extended family is very important in developing countries,
helping to support not only the elderly in the absence of social
security, but also the unemployed, as well as helping in the finance
of higher education. The extended family cannot be expected to accept
the same degree of responsibility as the parents however. Brothers
and other family members employed in the city and living near the
college frequently help out by supplying room and board, which there-
fore is a portion of living costs that should not be subsidized a
second time by loan or tax funds.
Questions 19 and 20 ask whether the student will live at home or
with a relative. If so, living cost subsidies are not needed. Some-
times the student is essentially a servant in the relative's home,
working a room and board job, since there are few of these at the
colleges. This is more likely to be true if the supportive relative's
income is low. So if the parents' income is also low a partial
tuition waiver may be justified. But if the brother or uncle has high
-23-
incorae , such as that of an Army General, this will be revealed by
questions 21-23 about his tax number, taxes paid, occupation, and
rank. In this case, no aid or a student tuition loan without a
tuition waiver would be more appropriate.
Crit eria for Computing the Family's Expected Contribution
The parents' expected contribution notf can be computed based on
this information about the parents' income and net assets, and the
income of any supportive member of the extended family. The computer
must be programmed to deduct a maintenance allowance from income for
the parents and their other dependents, as well as setting aside a
retirement allowance from net assets for the parents.
The Standard Maintenance Al l owance is based on national surveys of
consumption resulting in a cost estimate for families with specific
numbers of dependents. It must be adjusted annually by a consumer
price index to reflect the inflation rate expected in the upcoming
year. Most developing countries have consumer expenditure surveys and
some have standard household budgets similar to those prepared in the
United States by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, since they are needed
for assigning weights to get a consumer price index. If the nation
has no CP1, the average blue collar wage in manufacturing could sub-
stitute for the standard budget.
Table 6 below gives an example of a standard maintenance allowance
computed for Indonesia based on the SUSENAS survey of consumption
expenditure conducted by the Indonesian Census Bureau. The per-
centages in Col. 3 show the percent added by each additional dependent
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Table 6
Standard Maintenance Allowance
f or the Parents^ anci Their _De p
e
ndents
Illustrated for Indonesia
Family Size
(Including Applicant)
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
each additional
Allowance Percent
(1937)" Increment
500,000
•a
Rupiah 100 base
625,000 25%
763,000 23
907,000 18
1,061,000 17
1,178,000 11
1,296,000 10
1,412,000 9%
Sources: a) McMahon, Millot, and Eng (1986, pp. 235-6).
b) ACT (1986, p. 3).
in the U.S. in 1987 as computed by the BLS. This relationship may be
useful with appropriate refinements in developing countries that have
not estimated budgets for dependents. This allowance then must be
reduced by 9% for each dependent child other than the applicant who is
away at college. This recognizes that some savings occur if addi-
tional children live out of the home; if they live at home, this will
be recognized in the student budget used for their need analysis.
Once the standard maintenance allowance in Table 6 is programmed
into the computer, the appropriate deduction from the family's income
is made automatically. Rather than making sophisticated additional
deductions for local Kabupatan taxes paid, medical expenses, and
secondary school 3P3 and SPP fees paid, it is probably better to err
here and in other developing countries in the direction of simplicity,
and to assume that a standard allowance for these expenses is included
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in the standard maintenance allowance for the parents and other
dependent children as shown above. Available income is total family
income less this allowance. It is the discretionary income available
for raising the family's living standard as well as for financing the
higher education of the children.
Wealth . The treatment of the parents' assets within the computer
program must first subtract the debts reported on the form to obtain
net worth. Then a fraction of the net value of the home and other
assets are protected to provide for the parents' retirement. The
fraction increases with the age of the eldest parent. The formula
for the amount of assets set aside is based on the current cost of an
annuity that would provide the parents a moderate level of living
throughout their retirement years. Future inflation must be built
into this formula using the inflation rate specific to each develop-
ing country. But no allowance normally need be made for social
security since social security programs are rare in developing coun-
tries. Life expectancy data can be obtained from the World Bank's
(1986) World Development Report statistical appendix for each country.
The annuity formula used by the Uniform Methodology (ACT, 1986, p. 4)
ignoring loading charges is:
(5) A = M(1+P )< L+^/ 2 (U-(l+r*)
n"L
3 )(1+rA) -n
A = asset protection allowance,
M = moderate budget for a retired couple, from Table 6,
p = expected average annual rate of inflation (e.g., 6%),
L = life expectancy (50 in Indonesia), less current age (from form),
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n = retirement age (48 in Indonesia), less current age (from form),
r* = rate of return on the annuity (e.g., 8%).
The resulting asset protection allowance can also be stored in the
computer quite simply as illustrated in Table 7. This amount ^hich
depends on the parents' age is deducted from total assets to obtain
"Discretionary Net Worth."
Table 7
Home and Retirement Asset Protection Allowance
Illustration from the U.S., 1987
Age of Allowance Allowanc e for
Older Parent for 2 Parents Single Parent
25 or under
26 $ 1,900 $ 1,400
27 3,700 2,900
48 34,300 26,200
49 35,500 26,900
50 36,500 27,500
65 or over 61,400 42,300
This discretionary net worth is then converted into an "equivalent"
amount of income by assuming it will be used up by the death of the
parents. This is consistent with the life cycle theory of saving wheiv
the planned bequests of parents are treated as bequeathed before death
through investment in their children's human capital. The net worth
left after the asset protection allowance is deducted can therefore be
converted into an equivalent income stream by treating it as the
present value of a stream lasting up to the parents' death. Since
life expectancy averages 50 years in developing countries including
Indonesia, and 42-43 years in Africa, the appropriate asset conversion
rates using an 3% discount rate are 14% for Indonesia and 28% for
Africa. The asset conversion rate would be larger if the rate of
return available in the country is greater than 8%.
The Parents' Expec t ed Contribu t ion then can be printed out by the
computer program after adding this net worth times the asset conver-
sion rate to the parents' available income, and multiplying the re-
sulting adjusted available income by an appropriate tax rate. The
suggested tax rate schedule in Table 8 recognizes that the parents'
maintenance and retirement allowances protect some income. taxing it
in effect at a zero rate, so the rate at which fees are paid phases in
above this level. This recognizes that the parents' maintenance
allowance is close to base subsistence in developing countries. It
also recognizes that net assets are not taxed very heavily in view of
their illiquidity and the asset conversion rate used above. The
schedule also recognizes that income and wealth are more unequally
distributed in the lower income developing countries for which data is
available than they are in the United States. Most important, the
schedule is realistic in recognizing that there is no ability to pay
in the lower income brackets, and that this investment by the parents
in their child's further education is a saving and investment process .
The parents refrain from consumption, and invest the resources in
higher education (releasing some tax resources for reallocation to
primary education). Any resources that they might have saved anyway
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Table 8
Samp le Tax Rate Schedule
For De termining the Parent s' Expe cted Contr ibutlon
Adjusted Available Income
Above the Parents' Main-
tenance and Retirement
Allowances
0, or less
1st Quartile
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
4th Quartile
Parents ' Expected Contr ibut ion
(as a percent of fees and
net living costs)
25%
50%
100%
100%
are invested productively for the society since the rates of return
are high. But to the extent that upper income parents are encouraged
to refrain from consumption and invest in the education of their
children instead, the effect is to directly increase the developing
nation's total investment in economic growth.
Unmet need is calculated as the final step. The parents' ex-
pected contribution as calculated above is deducted from the student's
tuition plus the standard living cost budget of a student living on
campus. If the student will be living with a member of his extended
family, his costs would be calculated net of any room and board
supplied by the supportive member of the extended family based on the
answers to questions 19-23 above.
There would be no unmet need in the upper income groups, and
families would pay full fees. The other income quartiles among the
qualified applicants with academic merit would be eligible for much
more selective financial aid than that now provided indiscriminately
to those without need. Tuition waivers would be reserved for the
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neediest among those who are academically qualified, with student
loans for this group and the next neediest group, with part-tine jobs
for all that have any remaining unmet need. These "offers" (i.e.,
fee waiver and loan upper limits) then would be mailed directly to the
parent, the student, and the campus financial aid officer.
Many further refinements to the unmet need concept are possible.
But they seem to add unduly to the complexity in ways that would con-
tribute to making the system unworkable in less developed countries.
"Independent student" allowances for example that are discussed
elsewhere in this volume are an unaffordable luxury in subsistence
economies. Student budgets tailored to specific universities are
irrelevant in the many developing countries where there is only one
university. In countries where there are more, one nationwide
standard student budget probably is politically more acceptable, more
equitable, and certainly is less complex.
Finally it must be stressed that the entire context throughout is
to aid students displaying academic merit, and who therefore are
admissible, but whose parents do not have the financial resources
and who are excluded as fees are raised. Although the achievement
test scores and rank in the high school class used to measure poten-
tial are not distributed equally among all children, irrespective of
their earlier schooling, nevertheless the parents' wealth is not a
reasonable test of academic merit. Excluding those who cannot pay
therefore is not an efficient method of selecting those who can bene-
fit and contribute later. If financial aids are not to be provided to
all indiscriminately, efficiency and equity therefore both require
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some workable means of determining need and hence the parents'
expected contribution.
IV . How Financial Need Analysis is a Necessary
Element in Achieving Efficiency and Equity
The severe problems in financing higher education in the develop-
ing countries and the common recommendations that fees for higher edu-
cation be increased often omit considering the implications if this
is done without a careful determination of financial need as the basis
for more selective financial aid. To prevent the clear result of ex-
cluding all but the children of the very well to do, usually student
loans are suggested, similar to the pattern in Sweden (e.g.,
Psacharopoulos , Tan, and Jiminez, 1986). But this alone merely shifts
the burden heavily to the students, and ignores the parents who are
the main realistic source of significantly increased potential financ-
ing, as well as contributes to other inefficiencies as will be
developed below. The reason for overlooking the parents' expected
contribution does not seem to be any opposition to financial need
analysis per se , or to expecting a contribution from the parents—the
main reason instead seems to be merely a lack of available procedures.
Student Loans as Part of a Means-Tested
Financial Aid Package
It is sometimes argued that access to student loans do not need to
be means tested because the loans are to be repaid. There are several
problems with this.
The first is that student loan interest rates are often subsi-
dized, and as a result, scarce loan funds must be rationed. In
Germany, for example, student loans are more like grants, with a five
year grace period, 20 year repayment period and zero interest. In
the U.S. they are closer to real loans, with interest rates that
fluctuate between 7 and 9 percent. Even if student loans are not
subsidized directly to keep them below the economy-wide interest rate
plus a reasonable risk premium left after the government guarantee
reduces the risk to the lender, student loans are likely to be subsi-
dized by tax coverage of some of the administrative costs. Educa-
tional loan funds in developing countries tend to be relatively small
with considerable pent-up denand. In Indonesia, for example, no loans
are available to students applying for admission, and only students
who are enrolled and further along are eligible. Student loans are an
important form of financial aid for students throughout Scandanavia,
in Canada, in the United States, in Japan, have recently replaced
grants in West Germany, and are widely used in Latin America. But the
United Kingdom has virtually zero "self help" by students, and only a
few countries in Africa and Asia have loan programs. Many developing
counties have none. Failure to employ an objective means test enables
those families who could otherwise support their children in college
to borrow at a subsidized rate. These families then pre-empt the
limited loan funds, excluding from college the child from the poor
family where the first borrowing must be to support the child in
college. The most selfish parents are the ones that benefit the most
from this indiscriminate access to loans. Furthermore, on equity
grounds, since loans are normally subsidized, again the poor wind up
subsidizing the well to do.
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Part-tiae Jobs as Part of a Student
Financial Aid Package
Campus employment opportunities also are not unlimited. If these
jobs, including research assistantships and part time library, food
service, and computer jobs are given to full time employees, options
for increasing the resources available for higher education are lost.
If they are given to students, but indiscriminately so that some are
not reserved for students whose parents cannot help to cover the
costs, again additional resources are lost. The need for careful
means testing for work study is less pronounced than it is for tuition
waivers and for maintenance grants because the subsidy is smaller (as
with loans) and there is more of a quid pro quo. But still a means
test eliminates the displacement of those with greater need. A case
can be made for a means test here also therefore on both efficiency
and equity grounds.
The Parents' Contribution as a Key Element
Combining student "self help" through loans and jobs with a
parental expected contribution determined by financial need analysis,
the result is the possibility of a more comprehensive, coherent,
financial aid package for each student. The first copy of the com-
puter printout sets upper limits for the financial aid officer respon-
sible for a few tuition waivers and room and board subsidies for the
neediest cases. The—mo*e
—
indi s crimi nate—p-rovlsie^v -of- these subsidies
curren t ly run up the public co s t o-f- higher education a great deal.
More flexible guidelines would simultaneously be set for loans and
work-study, with the second copy of the computer printout mailed to
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each student (and/or his family) and clearly explaining how the total
costs of financing his or her education can be covered. A. uniform
computerized methodology for calculating the pareuts expected contri-
bution vastly simplifies construction of this financial aid package.
Other Inefficiencies . The 6,5 years it takes to complete a four
year bachelors degree in Indonesia also is not very efficient (see
McMahon, Millot, and Eng (1986)). This may be correlated there and
in other developing countries with the large percent of college living
expenses and tuition that are subsidized. To test this correlation
for other developing countries would make a very interesting study.
But it is a reasonable hypothesis that this cost-based subsidy to-
gether with the Scripsi requirement delays degree completion.
Most American students work 10-15 hours a week at board jobs and
other campus library, grounds maintenance, stenographic, and food
service jobs. However, in many developing countries any work is
considered very low, and rather than viewing work experience as de-
sirable the student and his or her family is unproductively ashamed.
The availability of cheap labor is usually cited as the reason for
this lack of student involvement with part-time jobs. But it is not a
good one. What is more relevant is that this source for supporting
some of the higher education costs in place of tax dollars is being
lost. Tax dollars released in this way could produce other kinds of
employment. But beyond this unused source of support, part-time work
of 15 hours a week or less provides useful on the job work experience.
It is a serious complaint of employers in Indonesia, for example, as
well as in other developing countries, that college students who they
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hire have never worked at anything and therefore are not good at
supervising other workers. This is a serious source of external
inefficiency in the higher education system.
V. A Test of the Effect on Productivity
Another perspective on the relative contribution of primary and
secondary education to productivity growth, in this case for 30
African countries for five year periods from 1965 through 1935 can be
seen in Table 9. Equation 1 explains growth in real output per person
employed (y-n) by means of investment in primary and secondary educa-
tion (IH/Y) , in higher education (1HE/Y), and in physical capital
(1K/Y). Each takes effect with a lag, so the relations are recursive.
These components of total capital deepening then are influenced in
turn by the growth of per capita income (y-n), again with a lag, and
some other variables in equations (2), (3), and (4). Therefore total
investment contributes to income growth, and the reverse effect as
income growth in turn contributes to investment is taken into account.
The theoretical framework and the data sources are the same as in
Mc'lahon (1937), but this particular regression is not shown there.
This approach not only takes the two way flow of causation into
account, but also the resulting returns to the different forms of
investment (some of which are picked up in the lagged productivity-
change term (y-n) do not depend on assumptions that workers are paid
amounts equal to their true marginal products in the factor markets.
Instead direct marginal productivity of the various investments is
measured in the products market.
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The 16 Francophone countries in the regressions tend not only to
subsidize each college student heavily, but also as shown by Table 10
to expend a high 40% of their educational resources on the 2% of the
population vzho pursue higher education. In contrast, the Anglophone
countries spend only 26% of their educational resources on higher edu-
cation, and 39% of their educational resources on primary education
which is significantly larger than the 16% spent on primary education
in the Francophone countries.
Table 10
Distribution of Educational Resources and
Population by Level, 1980
Primary Education Higher Education
Africa Population Expenditure Population Expenditure
Francophone 36% 16% 2% 40%
Anglophone 33 39 1 26
Source: Mingat and Tan (1985a).
To test for the potential effects of some reallocation of educa-
tion expenditure on productivity growth, a dummy variable was inserted
in the regressions for the 14 Anglophone (+1) and 16 Francophone
countries. As can be seen in Eq . (1) the net relation to productivity
growth of the strategy in the Anglophone countries is positive,
although not terribly significant. A major portion of the positive
effect is picked up in the highly significant investment in primary
and secondary education term (1H/Y). Investment in higher education
has a negative relation to per capita growth in the following five
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years in Eq . (1). But this turns into a significant positive effect
when IHE/Y is lagged an additional five years (see McMahon, 1987,
Table 3, Eq . 10). The implication is that there are some positive
effects as new technology is embodied through higher education and
transferred (IHE/Y includes investment in students studying abroad),
an interesting discovery that merits further study.
In Eqs. (2-4) per capita income growth is associated in turn with
higher investment in physical and human capital as expected. But it
also can be seen that there is a relatively larger investment in
primary and secondary education in the Anglophone countries, and a
significantly smaller investment in higher education there as revealed
by the dummy variable for Anglophone (+1) and for Francophone (0) in
Eqs. (3) and (4). The low levels of adult literacy (18%) in the
Francophone countries, the three-fold higher-than-elsewhere per stu-
dent costs due to subsidization of study living expense, and some
other aspects of this misallocation are developed further by Mingat
and Psacharopoulos (1988, pp. 36-7). But tests of the relation of
this financing pattern to productivity growth have not been tried
previously.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
There is a relatively untapped potential for greater resource
recovery in higher education in the developing countries but it re-
quires more selectivity in financial aids based on need among quali-
fied students than the indiscriminate subsidies provided at present.
The methods for computing the parents' expected contribution developed
_"0 3-
above has the potential for both sharing the costs in a more balanced
way among students, parents, and taxpayers as well as for increasing
both efficiency and equity. k prototype form for collecting the
necessary financial information is developed for experimentation,
adaptation, and use in each country that is currently without such a
system.
Tie problems that are likely to arise are discussed throughout
the paper, together with possible solutions. To encourage honesty,
the forms have stressed using only objective information that is
direct (no hear-say), self-verifying or easily verifiable. The argu-
ment that students should not work 10-15 hours a week because it is
"below" them is answered in terras of their employability later; the
argument that they would displace only cheap labor that would other-
wise be unemployed is answered in terms of the potential alternative
uses of tax funds that create jobs. The political opposition to
asking parents and students from high income families who now are the
primary beneficiaries to pay more is likely to be the main real
obstacle, even though many other reasons are likely to be given.
To circumvent this it is probably necessary to "grandfather" the cur-
rent student body, and propose withdrawal of living allowances, \ hoX
tuition schedules and financial aid packages for those with need) that
apply to each succeeding freshman class as they apply for admission.
The increased resource recovery that would permit would allow
A
some reallocation to primary levels where rates of return are higher,
as well as further attainment of economies of scale in higher educa-
tion, both increasing social efficiency and contributing more than at
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present to economic growth. Efficiency also would be advanced by
helping students to relate to the labor force later by giving more
students part-time work experience, by providing an economic incentive
through fewer subsidies to limit wastefully long times spent in BA.
programs, and by developing the skills of academically able children
from poor families who otherwise would be excluded from higher educa-
tion.
Equity also would be advanced by reforming a system where the
highest income groups receive most of the benefit but pay little of
the costs that are borne by taxes paid by lower income groups who are
excluded.
Finally, there are no panaceas, but it is harder to defend the
more polarized alternatives as either more efficient or more equit-
able—either no fees and extensive subsidies for everybody irrespec-
tive of need, or fees that cover fall costs and student loans avail-
able for all.
-40-
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